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ABSTRACT 
 
THE IMPACTS OF HEALTH SECTOR REFORM ON THE EFFICIENCY 
AND PRODUCTIVITY OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE HOSPITALS IN 
TURKEY  
 
 
Diler, Müge 
M.A., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Osman Zaim 
September 2009 
 
Hospitals consume the largest share of government health resources. Since they 
account for such a large share of health expenditure, improvements in their efficiency 
and productivity will yield tremendous benefits for the entire health sector. On this 
basis, in 2003, the government of Turkey declared a reform program called 
“Transformation in Health”. This study by using a rich panel data of 440 hospitals 
operating in 81 province in Turkey (observed throughout 2001-2007 i.e. pre and post 
reform periods) addresses the impacts of health sector reform on the efficiency and 
productivity of the public and private hospitals by employing Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA), bootstrapping and Malmquist productivity index. The results of the 
analysis indicate that slightly reduced efficiency of previously SSK owned hospitals 
have been more than offset by increased efficiency in MoH hospitals as well as in 
private and university hospitals, leading to an accessible, standardized and higher 
quality health services covering almost the whole population and that in overall, the 
reform has improved the productivity of all hospitals implying that health sector 
reform has succeeded. 
Keywords: data envelopment analysis, Malmquist productivity index, bootstrapping,  
health sector reform, hospital efficiency and productivity 
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ÖZET 
 
SAĞLIK REFORMU’NUN TÜRKİYE’DEKİ DEVLET HASTANELERİNİN 
VE ÖZEL HASTANELERİN ETKİNLİĞİ VE VERİMLİLİĞİ ÜZERİNDEKİ 
ETKİLERİ 
 
Diler, Müge 
Yüksek Lisans, İktisat Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Osman Zaim 
Eylül 2009 
 
Devletin sağlık sektörü için ayırdığı kaynakların en büyük kısmını hastaneler tüketir. 
Sağlık harcamalarının büyük kısmının hastaneler tarafından tüketmesinden dolayı, 
hastanelerin etkinlik ve verimliliklerindeki iyileşmeler, tüm sağlık sektörü için büyük 
fayda sağlayacaktır. Buna dayanarak Türkiye‟de 2003 yılında, hükümet “Sağlıkta 
Dönüşüm” olarak adlandırılan reform programını ilan etti. Bu çalışma, Türkiye‟nin 
81 ilinde faaliyet gösteren 440 hastaneyi içeren zengin bir panel veri kullanarak 
Sağlık Reformu‟nun devlet hastaneleri ve özel hastanelerin etkinliği ve verimliliği 
üzerindeki etkilerini 2001-2007 yılları boyunca (reform öncesi ve sonrası dönem) 
Veri Zarflama Teknikleri, Malmquist Verimlilik İndeksi ve Bootstrapping Tekniği‟ni 
kullanarak araştırmaktadır. Analiz sonuçları, Sağlık Bakanlığı‟na ait hastaneler, 
üniversite hastaneleri ve özel hastanelerin etkinlik ve verimliliklerindeki önemli 
artışların daha önce SSK‟ya ait olan hastanelerin etkinlik ve verimliliklerindeki az 
miktar düşüşe baskın geldiğini ve bu durumun nüfusun neredeyse tamamını 
kapsayan, ulaşılabilir, standart ve daha kaliteli sağlık hizmetlerinin sağlanmasına 
öncülük ettiğine ve bununla birlikte tüm hastanelerde önemli verimlilik artışları 
gözlendiğine işaret etmektedir.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: veri zarflama teknikleri, Malmquist verimlilik indeksi, 
bootstrapping, sağlık reformu, hastane etkinliği ve verimliliği 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The period of 1980s, can be characterized as a new era in the world economic and 
political system due to the strengthening of the neoliberal ideas which support 
liberalization, deregulation, privatization and outsourcing of the public services. 
Hence, most of the welfare states began to implement various reform policies that are 
in line with neoliberal ideas in order to restructure their public service sector. Starting 
with the 1990s, as a response to neoliberalism, Turkey began to experience a period 
of reform process in its public service sector. With the elections of November 2002, 
the newly elected government has designed series of reform packages. In December 
2003, Turkish government declared a reform program called “Transformation in 
Health”. The main objectives of reform could be summarized as follows: setting up a 
single retirement insurance regime that includes short and long term insurance 
branches other than health insurance; creation of a general health insurance towards 
financing the provision of a high quality health service for all population, which is 
fair, equal, protective and curative; gathering of social benefits and services that are 
currently being carried out in a scattered manner under one umbrella; establishment 
of a system based on objective benefit criteria and which is accessible by all groups 
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who are in need and finally creation of a new institutional structure, which will 
ensure the provision of above mentioned services in a modern and efficient manner. 
Despite its paramount problems, the Turkish health care system is now well on its 
way to structural change. The driving force behind the current momentum is 
Turkey‟s commitments to both IMF and the EU, coupled with having a majority 
government that is able to command the support of the legislature. Many critical 
steps have already been undertaken. In January 2005, all social security institutions 
in Turkey; namely, Social Security Association (hereafter “SSK”), Pension Fund for 
Civil Servants (hereafter “ES”) and Social Insurance Agency of Merchants, Artisans 
and the Self-employed (hereafter “BK”) are united under one roof under the 
supremacy of Ministry of Health (MoH) in order to terminate this four-partite 
structure of the social security system. 
The social security reform which is currently being implemented includes 
restructuring of MoH to complete its institutional transformation from a mainly 
provider of services to a regulator of service provision  with a view to developing 
policies, defining standards, controlling health care providers and monitoring the 
appropriate use of resources. To this end, the transfer of the management and control 
of the all public hospitals operated by the SSK, and merger of some these with those 
that were operated by the MoH have been expected not only to benefit from a better 
allocation of scarce health resources among hospitals, but also to utilize scale 
economies that are present to its fullest extent. Moreover, IMF-sought Social 
Security and Universal Health Insurance Law, increased the retirement age and 
unified all social security beneficiaries under one roof. This law, while broadening 
the coverage of the insured and hence increasing the demand for the public health 
service provision, had also repercussions on the demand for health service provision 
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by private hospitals, since it allowed government employees, members of SSK and 
self-employed beneficiaries to benefit from the services offered by private hospitals.  
Motivated by those developments in Turkish health sector, this study presents an 
empirical analysis of the relative efficiency and productivity of Turkish private and 
public hospitals before and after the reform by using a national data set obtained 
from the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Health. The methods used to assess relative 
efficiency and productivity are Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Malmquist 
productivity index. The study improves upon the traditional DEA, efficiency and 
Malmquist productivity scores by employing a procedure called bootstrapping that 
permits to estimate bias corrected efficiency scores and productivity indices. Since 
bootstrap is seen as the only way of assessing statistical properties (i.e. bias, 
variance, confidence interval) of the efficiency estimators that comes from some data 
generating process, it allows to make statistical inferences based on those DEA-
estimators, as opposed to the econometric approaches which argue that DEA 
techniques are non-statistical and that statistical noise caused by DEA-estimators 
may introduce bias. By using this method, the study investigates the impacts of 
health care reform on relative performances of public and private hospitals in Turkey 
over 2001-2007. 
The organization of the thesis is as follows: The next chapter is reserved for a brief 
description of the Turkish health care delivery system and reform process. Chapter 3 
is devoted to the survey of the DEA literature and Malmquist productivity index. 
Chapter 4 describes the methodology used in this study to measure hospital 
efficiency and productivity. Chapter 5 provides the information on the data used, 
discusses the main variables of the model and empirical results of the analysis and 
evaluates the impacts of the reform. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE TURKISH HEALTH CARE DELIVERY 
SYSTEM 
 
 
 
2.1. Pre-Reform Period 
Ministry of Health (MoH) was established in May 1920 to provide, control and 
coordinate the health care services throughout Turkey. Since those years correspond 
to the war years which would ultimately lead to the establishment of the Turkish 
Republic in 1923, with no established private health infrastructure, the MoH assumed 
the sole responsibility for the provision of health care services. Turkey‟s health care 
structure relied on the Bismarckian tradition that based itself on the employment 
status which then led itself to a four-partite, non-universal social security and health 
service provision system.  
The first attempt to constitute a social insurance fund came in 1946. With the 
establishment of SSK within the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, manual 
laborers working under a service contract (i.e. private sector and blue-collar public 
sector workers) were provided health insurance and several social protection 
insurances against industrial accidents, occupational diseases, sickness, maternity, 
invalidity, old-age pension and survivors insurance. The institution operated both as 
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an insurer and a health care provider for its members and their dependents. SSK 
provided health care services through its own hospitals.  The system was financed by 
premiums paid by its members and by transfers from state budget if a deficit occurs. 
The social security and health insurance coverage had been broadened in 1950, with 
the establishment of ES. It was a pension fund for retired civil servants and it 
provided health insurance and health care services both for retired and actively 
working members along with their dependents. The members and their dependents 
were provided basic health care services at MoH (i.e. public) hospitals. In this 
insurance system, there was no specific health insurance premium collected from 
either active civil servants or pensioners. Instead, it was financed by state budget 
allocations. The disadvantage of the system was that since all the financing was done 
by state budget allocations, this caused a large deficit in MoH budget and so in 
general state budget. The system was operating in the following manner: The fund 
had financed all health care expenditures of retired government employees with only 
a 10 percent drug co-payment paid by users. Moreover, health care expenditures of 
active civil servants were met by their organizations via specific state budget 
allocations. After the completion of a specific period of state service, active ones 
became pensioners and began to benefit some privileges that were granted to 
pensioners only.  
Finally, in 1971, BK was established. Hence, from 1971 onwards there were mainly 
three institutions that constitute Turkish Social Security System: SSK, ES, and BK. 
With the establishment of BK, the social security and health insurance coverage were 
extended towards the self employed. The scheme required compulsory membership 
and hence premium payments for the self-employed who were excluded from the 
Social Insurance Law. Those were crafts-people, artisans, and small business owners, 
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technical and professional people registered through a professional chamber or 
association and shareholders of companies other than co-operatives. Nevertheless, 
the scope of coverage had increased by granting voluntary membership and premium 
payments to unemployed people, housewives, local community elders, people of 
Turkish origin (and carrying a foreign passport) who live in Turkey, and the 
unemployed wives of Turkish nationals working abroad. In 1983, voluntarily access 
to insurance through BK was extended to self employed agricultural workers (under 
Law 2926). In 1985-86, the scope of insurance was also extended to include health 
insurance. Since February 1999, health insurance had been extended to agricultural 
workers.  Diverging from other social insurance systems, BK had no health facilities 
of its own but rather purchased the health services for its members by entering into 
contractual arrangements with other public health service providers, including the 
SSK hospitals. Thus, contributors of this system could only benefit from those 
hospitals that had contract with BK. Members of BK could choose the level at which 
they made their contributions that ranged from lowest premium payment level  
covering limited number of basic health care services to the highest. In this system, 
at first, the insured paid for the medical expenses and then got reimbursed by BK. 
Pensioners of the system had to pay 10%, whereas active members and their 
dependents pay 20% of drug costs. 
In early 1990s, increased population and higher demand for health care services 
resulted in overcrowding and insufficiency of services provided in hospitals, unequal 
access to health care, unequal dispersion of health personnel and facilities among 
different geographic regions of Turkey and loss of confidence in public health 
services. As a response to those problems, during this period, Turkish health system 
experienced some unsuccessful reform attempts that aimed to increase the rate of 
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population covered by social insurance programs, to set up universal health insurance 
to remove the inequalities within the system, to encourage private investment in 
health sector and to improve managerial efficiency of hospitals by giving them more 
independence and so promoting competition among public hospitals. Although the 
targets of reform were well-defined, the means of its implementation were not. 
However, it can be said that attracting private investment into the health sector which 
resulted in increased number of private hospitals was the only achievement of the 
reform in this period. 
In addition to social security systems discussed so far, in 1992, The Green Card 
system was introduced in Turkey. In this system which is directly funded by 
government, with special authorization given to the  MoH to issue Green Card, poor 
people earning less than a subsistence level of income which is defined by the law, 
are endowed with a special card giving free access to outpatient and inpatient care at 
the state and some university hospitals. With this card patients are able to meet all of 
their inpatient medical drug expenses, but not the expenses on outpatient drugs. The 
percentage of population covered by the Green Card system was 0.6 in 1992 but 
increased to 16.4 in 2001. This system continues to perform today but the 
expenditures for the almost 11 million Green Card holders have exceeded 
government allocations, and increased the budget deficit.  
In early 2000s, although several attempts were made to establish financially 
sustainable, general health insurance system covering the whole population, they 
could not be implemented successfully. Thus, problems of the existing system had 
grown gradually.  In this period, as shown in table 2.1.1., three major organizations 
ES, SSK, and BK covered 14.75%, 57.71% and 26.96% of population, respectively. 
Besides those listed; YOK (university hospitals), state economic enterprises, 
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municipalities, other public institutions, special funds, foundations, Green Card 
system and private health insurance companies also played a role in the provision of 
health care services in Turkey. In 2000, %82.2 of the population were insured, and 
80.9% of those were covered by a health insurance.  
Table 2.1.1. The Population Covered by Social Insurance Programs  
 
    INSTITUTIONS 2000 % in 2000 2003 2005 % in 2005 
I.  THE PENSION FUND OF CIVIL 
SERVANTS IN TOTAL (ES) 8,230,201 14.75 9,238,101 9,270,512 13.89 
    1. Active Insured 2,156,176  2,408,148 2,402,409  
    2. Pensioners (retired, invalid, widow, 
widower, orphan) 1,296,935  1,466,679 1,595,973  
    3. Dependants  4,777,090  5,363,274 5,272,130  
II. THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
ASSOCIATION IN TOTAL (SSK) 32,192,374 57.71 35,064,765 41,166,730 61.69 
    1. Active Insured 5,283,234  5,655,647 6,965,937  
    2. Voluntary Active Insured  843,957  697,630 266,558  
    3. Active Insured in Agriculture 184,675  165,268 178,178  
    4.Pensioners (retired, invalid, widow, 
widower, orphan) 3,339,327  3,935,523 4,308,186  
    5. Dependants  22,541,181  24,610,697 29,447,871  
III. SOCIAL INSURANCE AGENCY OF 
MERCHANTS,ARTISANS AND SELF-
EMPLOYED IN TOTAL (BK) 15,036,318 26.96 15,881,624 15,990,253 23.96 
    1. Active Insured 2,181,586  2,224,247 2,103,651  
    2. Voluntary Active Insured 254,960  236,398 239,388  
    3. Active Insured in Agriculture 876,148  923,204 1,011,333  
     4.Pensioners (retired, invalid, widow, 
widower, orphan)  1,277,444  1,445,820 1,600,294  
    5. Dependants  10,446,180  11,051,955 11,035,587  
IV.THE PRIVATE FUNDS IN TOTAL 323,569 0.58 295,653 306,169 0.46 
    1. Active Insured 78,495  70,925 75,552  
    2. Pensioners (retired, invalid, widow, 
widower, orphan) 71,266  71,715 76,027  
    3. Dependants  173,808  153,013 154,590  
VI. GENERAL TOTAL 55,782,462 100 60,480,143 66,733,664 100 
    1. Active Insured 9,699,491  10,358,967 11,547,549  
    2. Voluntary Active Insured 1,098,917  934,028 505,946  
    3. Active Insured in Agriculture 1,060,823  1,088,472 1,189,511  
    4. Total Active Insured  11,859,231  12,381,467 13,243,006  
    5. Pensioners (retired, invalid, widow, 
widower, orphan) 5,984,972  6,919,737 7,580,480  
    6. Dependants  37,938,259  41,178,939 45,910,178  
SOCIAL INSURANCE COVERAGE 
WITH RESPECT TO HEALTH    
SERVICES  54,938,505  59,782,513 66,467,106  
RATIO OF INSURED POPULATION 
(Percent) 82.2  85.6 92.0  
RATIO OF INSURED POP. COVERED 
BY HEALTH SERVICES (Percent) 80.9  84.6 91.7  
IX.  TOTAL POPULATION 67,893,000  70,692,000 72,520,000  
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As table suggests, before the reform took place, private hospitals served for just 
%0.58 of the population whereas SSK was responsible for the health care delivery of 
%57.71 of the population which eventually led to overcrowding in SSK hospitals and 
unequal health service delivery among different institutions. Per constituency rates in 
table 2.1.2., clearly shows the extent of this inequality.  
Table 2.1.2. Distribution, Endowments and Per Constituency Rates of Institutions 
 
Institution Number of 
Hospitals 
Number 
of Beds 
Beds Per 
Constituency 
Number of 
Specialists 
Specialists 
Per 
Constituency  
Number of 
Practitioners 
Practioners 
Per 
Constituency  
MoH 751 87709 76 13837 367 28983 218 
SSK 118 28517 536 4801 6705 3311 9723 
University
*
 43 24754 - 8586 - 8760 - 
Private 239 11922 27 8665 37 2870 113 
 
When compared to the rest of the institutions, SSK hospitals served for the maximum 
number of patients with minimum level of endowments before the reform. 
Obviously, in SSK hospitals, this would decrease the quality of health care and hence 
increase the inequality among patients treated. Thus, a successful reform attempt 
should be the one that could shift excess demand on SSK hospitals towards MoH and 
private hospitals in order to create more egalitarian health care delivery system. 
According to table 2.1.1., over the period of five years however, with a rather 
increased burden on SSK, coverage have expanded by about %10 both with respect 
to ratio of insured population and with respect to ratio of insured population covered 
by health services. However, the broadened coverage of the social security system 
                                                 
*Note that since university hospitals operate under the rule of MoH, to obtain per constituency rates 
for MoH hospitals, the number of beds, specialists and practitioners in university hospitals are added 
to those of MoH. So, there is no need to calculate per constituency rates for university hospitals, 
separately.  
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has been achieved at the expense of ever growing deficits of all social security 
institutions even since the early 1990s. These deficits have required increasingly 
large transfers from the general government budget, prompting several reform 
attempts. The cumulative value of these deficits between 1994 and 2004, plus their 
debt servicing cost (based on the Treasury bill rate), was 475 billion YTL (about 
€200 billion) in 2004 prices, or approximately 110% of the 2004 GDP and 1.5 times 
the total consolidated debt stock as at the end of 2004. Indeed, the unsustainable 
social security system deserved a large part of the blame for Turkey‟s fiscal 
imbalances over the past decade.  
 
Figure 2.1.1. Budget Transfers to Social Security Institutions (1994-2005) 
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2.2. Transition Period  
At the beginning of the year 2003, the government of Turkey has been in the process 
of designing a comprehensive reform of its social security system. The proposed 
reform has four basic components: (i) a pension reform aimed at unifying the 
currently disperse system and to increase the pension age to reduce the deficit of 
pension payments to revenues; (ii) introduction of Universal Health Insurance 
complemented with health sector reform; (iii) establishment of high quality, fair, 
protective, egalitarian and curative health care service for the whole population; and 
(iv) an institutional reform with the establishment of a unified social security 
institution. 
Health sector reform has been an important and integral part of the social security 
reform since the rather dispersed and fragmented nature of the social security system 
also resulted in provision of health services in a rather dispersed manner such that 
each social security organization operating its own hospitals. Although the majority 
of the population was covered by the existing system, this partitioned structure of 
Turkish health system led to ineffective hospitals, low quality treatment and unequal 
access to health care services.  
The weaknesses of the existing system could be better understood when basic health 
indicators of Turkey are compared to those of OECD countries. For instance, 
although the health expenditure has a large share in government's general budget 
(%4.3), total expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP is just 6 percent in 
Turkey, in 2003 whereas 15.1 in USA and 10.9 in France. Moreover, figure 2.2.1. 
shows that, in 2004, number of total hospital beds per 1000 population in Turkey is 
2.6 whereas 14.2 in Japan and 7.5 in France and Belgium and physician density per 
1000 population is 1.5 in 2004, in Turkey but 4.9 in Greece. 
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Figure 2.2.1. Hospital Beds and Physician Density per 1000 Population in Selected 
OECD Countries 
 
Hence, in the light of those problems, in December 2003, with the support of IMF 
and EU, the government of Turkey declared a reform program called 
“Transformation in Health”. The motto of the reform was “Health for everyone” and 
the aim was to restructure, both functionally and administratively, MoH, cover all 
citizens by general health insurance, give autonomy to hospitals; attract the private 
investment into the health sector; distribute health personnel and facilities equally 
among regions and provide effective, accessible, egalitarian and high quality  health 
care system that unifies all social insurance organizations under one roof. The main 
principles of the reform that were in line with both „Health for All in 21 st Century‟ 
Policy of the WHO and „Accession Partnership‟ document prepared by the EU, were 
stated as human centrism, sustainability, continuous quality improvement, 
participation, division of power, decentralization and competition in service. (MoH, 
2004: 70). 
The reform process has been implemented gradually. First of all, as a result of the 
protocol signed between MoH and the Ministry of Finance in April 2003, civil 
servants are allowed to benefit from private health institutions. This reduced the 
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excess burden on public hospitals without incurring any cost and enabled patients to 
save waiting time. This attempt could be considered as a first step towards 
unification of all social security institutions under a single umbrella. 
As a second step, in July 2003, MoH, Ministry of Labor and Social Security and the 
Ministry of Finance signed a collective utilization protocol that enabled the members 
of BK, ES, active public employees and green card holders to benefit from SSK 
hospitals, and that enabled members of SSK to benefit from MoH (public) hospitals. 
The execution date of the protocol throughout Turkey was January 2004. With this 
attempt, the objective was to establish a common delivery and convergence in 
services of BK, ES and SSK which would enable equal access to health services, 
providing high quality treatment to patients and preventing patients to suffer from 
overcrowded hospitals. 
As a third and final step, in Feb 2005, with law no 5502, ownership of all SSK 
hospitals are transferred to the MoH. Hence, with this final step unification process 
of the reform has been completed. Thus, all security institutions are united under the 
name of SGK (Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu-Social Security Institution). In the current 
structure of health system all patients are covered by SGK and all patients could 
benefit from either MoH (public) hospitals, YOK (university hospitals) or private 
hospitals, operating under the administration of MoH. This initiated a new era in 
Turkish health system while the reform and transformation processes have not  been 
completed yet. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
 
 
Next sub section, summarizes the existing literature on DEA technique, and the 
following sub section summarizes the literature on Malmquist Productivity Index.  
 
3.1. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
DEA is the optimization method of mathematical programming. DEA is based on the 
piecewise linear convex hull approach to frontier estimation and is first proposed by 
Farrell (1957). DEA basically uses linear programming methods to construct a non-
parametric frontier over the data set and derives efficiency measures that are 
calculated relative to this frontier.  
Two decades following the Farrell's paper, Shephard (1970) suggested the use of 
mathematical programming methods that could not receive much attention in the 
literature until the path breaking paper of Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) in 
which the term DEA was first used. Since then, the method has become very popular 
in the literature. In their pioneering study, they developed an input orientated model 
with constant returns to scale (CRS) technology to measure relative efficiencies of 
decision making units. Their idea was extended further through the applied studies of 
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Fare, Grosskopf and Logan (1983) and Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) in which 
variable returns to scale (VRS) technology is assumed. 
Following those pioneering theoretical studies, great number of empirical studies has 
emerged. The first use of electronic computers to deal with linear programming 
problems was by Charnes, Cooper and Mellon (1952). In their study, they explained 
linear programming techniques in the context of a commercial application, namely 
blending aviation gasolines. 
Since 1978 paper of Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes, thousands of uses of DEA have 
appeared in the literature to measure efficiency in various sectors. Up to now, the 
DEA has been used to evaluate and compare the performances of educational 
departments (schools, colleges and universities), health care (hospitals, clinics) 
prisons, agricultural production, banking, armed forces, sports, market research, 
transportation, courts, benchmarking, index number construction which finally lead 
to the Malmquist index and many other applications. Moreover, subsequent papers 
has extended the use of DEA to cover dummy or categorical variables, discretionary 
and non-discretionary variables, incorporating value judgments, longitudinal 
analysis, weight restrictions, and stochastic DEA. Since there are more than thousand 
of empirical papers employing DEA technique, this chapter will focus on its 
empirical applications on the health care. 
Since DEA is a non-parametric technique in its original form, it lacked statistical 
properties. Opponents claim that  DEA efficiency estimators that come from some 
random data generating process  are non-statistical and statistical noise caused by 
DEA estimators would introduce bias to estimated efficiencies. However, to remove 
those anomalies inherent in DEA estimators, in their challenging studies Simar and 
Wilson (1993, 1998, 2000b, 2005) developed various measures based on the idea of 
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bootstrapping proposed by Efron (1979) originally. Moreover, Wilson (2008) 
developed a distinguished software package called Frontier Efficiency Analysis with 
R (FEAR) that incorporates the idea of bootstrapping to compute not only DEA 
estimates of technical, allocative and overall efficiency while assuming either 
variable, non-increasing or CRS but also Malmquist indices and scale efficiency 
measures.  
All of those developments in the DEA literature attract many researchers from 
various fields of study and this made DEA a highly credited technique among the 
other alternatives in measuring the efficiency of decision making units. Increasing 
costs and growing demands for health care services in most of the countries raised 
the public concern on measuring the performance of health care providers which 
finally became a controversial topic debated within a great body of literature 
nowadays. Several econometric methods are suggested and various performance 
indicators are developed for performance assessment. Some of those studies employ 
DEA which is a very popular technique in the literature currently whereas others 
prefer to use different econometric approaches. Yet, studies carried out in this field 
are still open to improvement.  
Amado and Dyson (2006) provide a detailed literature review and evaluates and 
compares the advantages and drawbacks of the methods used to measure the 
performance of primary care providers in UK. The paper, first classifies the empirical 
studies according to the technique used to measure performance: the ones that use 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) which assumes a particular functional form for 
the production function and hence considered to be a parametric approach and the 
ones that use DEA, and then concludes that DEA has certain advantages over SFA. 
The study points out that if the specific functional form chosen for the stochastic 
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production frontier does not represent the actual technology of primary care 
providers, the specification bias may lead to misleading efficiency measurements. On 
the contrary, since DEA involves the use of linear programming methods to construct 
a non-parametric piece-wise frontier over the data, efficiency measures that are 
calculated relative to this frontier will not carry a specification bias and hence will be 
more accurate. Hence, the paper claims that DEA could be considered as a 
challenging alternative to the existing methods. 
Puenpatom and Rosenman (2008) are concerned with the impact of Universal Health 
Coverage reform in Thailand on the efficiency of health care providers. They 
measure the efficiency before and during the transition period by using a two-stage  
DEA which involves bootstrapping and truncated regressions, proposed by Simar and 
Wilson (2005).  Input orientated model with VRS technology is assumed. In the first 
stage of the analysis, efficiency scores are estimated and in the second stage non-
parametric, bootstrapped estimates of efficiency scores are regressed on variables 
that are not considered in the first stage to account for exogenous factors that might 
affect hospitals' performance. Their sample consists of 92 Thai public hospitals (both 
regional and general) observed during the period 1999-2002. In the model, inputs are 
defined as the number of beds, physicians, nurses, dentists and pharmacists and other 
personnel and outputs are defined as the adjusted number of inpatient visits in acute 
surgical, in primary care and in others (where adjusted inpatient number refers to the 
ratio of large surgeries to total surgeries times the number of inpatients in related 
department). Their results suggest that transformation to new health system led to an 
improvement in large public hospitals' efficiency, particularly  in the regional ones, 
and  that the extent of efficiency improvement differ across regions in proportion to 
their wealth level. Moreover, as the number of referrals from other hospitals to public 
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hospitals increased, efficiency of both regional and general public hospitals improve. 
Another study to assess the performance of hospitals is proposed by Staat (2006). In 
his paper, he measures the performances of hospitals in Germany based on a 1994 
data by using DEA-bootstrap approach which is credited  by many authors in this 
literature based on Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000) work. Inputs are defined as per 
diem rate and number of beds and outputs are defined as number of cases treated per 
year and reciprocal of the length of stay. He, then groups hospitals according to their 
respective sizes. The results of the study show that significant productivity 
differences exist between nearly identical hospitals and that as a result of employing 
bootstrapping technique which provides bias-corrected results, hospitals which are 
indicated as inefficient by  DEA studies done so far, are actually more inefficient 
than they are thought to be. 
Rebba and Rizzi (2006) have also compared efficiency differentials between public 
and private health providers in Italy using DEA approach on a data set that is 
composed of 85 (public and private) hospitals. As an extension to the previous 
studies they put specific constraints on both input and output weights. Their results 
reveal that, low efficiency scores, especially for public hospitals, are attributable to 
external factors, which are not fully controlled by the hospital management and are 
mainly explained by past policy-makers‟ decisions. According to their results, non-
profit private hospitals exhibit a higher total inefficiency while both non-profit and 
for-profit hospitals are characterized by higher levels of scale inefficiency than 
public ones. 
Steinmann et. al. (2004) using DEA approach, measure and compare the 
performances of German and Swiss hospitals by using expenses (of academic, 
nursing and administrative staff), patient days and number of beds as inputs; and 
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number of cases treated (medical, pediatric, surgical, intensive) as outputs. Their 
study concludes that German hospitals are clearly more efficient than their Swiss 
counterparts and are larger in scale and size.  
More currently, Bernet et al. (2008), conduct a study on efficiencies in Ukrainian 
polyclinics to see whether recent elections lower the efficiencies of polyclinics in 
eastern regions using two stage DEA procedure. However, they find that polyclinics 
in western Ukraine are less efficient. Possible explanations of this result are also 
discussed in the paper. 
In addition to those studies discussed so far, Rosenman and Friesner (2004) and  
Kirkham and Boussabaine (2005) also studied the measurement of hospital 
performance based on DEA approach for USA and UK, respectively.  
Apart from those, Farsi (2008) studied the temporal variation of cost efficiency in 
Switzerland's general hospitals by employing mixed effects model rather than DEA. 
The financial data used in the analysis is of 168 hospitals over the period 1998-2003. 
The paper constructs a cost frontier. In the model, output of any hospital is measured 
by the number of hospitalizations obtained through multiplying total admissions by 
an average cost weight calculated every year for each hospital and an amount of 
ambulatory services offered by the hospital. Two inputs that are considered are 
capital and labor and hence their prices are used as right hand side variables in the 
cost function. The paper concludes that there exists an increasing trend in hospitals' 
operating costs and the basic factor that determines hospital efficiency is the number 
of empty beds which indicate the existing unused capacity. 
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3.2. Malmquist Productivity Index  
The Malmquist productivity index is used to measure and compare the productivity 
growth of different producing units from one period to another. Measurement is 
based on constructing best practice frontiers for adjacent years by using data on 
inputs and outputs of all producing units in the sample and then computing the output 
growth that is caused by shift of the frontier for each individual producing unit. What 
distinguishes Malmquist index from the other alternative productivity indices such as 
Törnquist and Fischer is that (since it is composed of distance functions) it does not 
require any information on prices to calculate the productivity. That is, Malmquist 
index is based only on quantity data and does not make any assumption on the 
functional form for the technology employed. Hence, Malmquist index is considered 
as superior to alternative indices, particularly in cases when researcher does not have 
any information regarding prices. 
Another advantage of Malmquist index is that since it can be decomposed into two 
components, one which measures changes in technical efficiency (i.e. whether firms 
are getting closer to the production frontier over time), and one which measures 
changes in technology (i.e. whether the production frontier is moving outwards over 
time), it can provide additional insights (Bradley, 2006: 1). 
Malmquist index is named after Stan Malmquist's (1953) study. The path breaking 
paper that was proposed by Caves et al. (1982) redefined the index as a ratio of 
distance functions and later, Fare et al. (1989b) showed how this index could be 
calculated by using non parametric linear programming methods. As a result of those 
successful attempts, the index has gained popularity in applied studies Based on 
those papers, Caves et al. (1982a, 1982b) showed how Malmquist index could be 
decomposed into two as efficiency change and technical change. Ray and Desli 
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(1997) has further decomposed Malmquist index as technical change, efficiency 
change and scale efficiency change. More recently, based on the inverse relationship 
between output distance functions and output oriented technical efficiency measures, 
Fare et al. (1995) proposed a method to calculate the Malmquist index relative to non 
parametric frontier (Borger and Kerstens, 2000: 303). 
Those successful theoretical studies are followed by large number of applied studies 
in various fields. Up to now, Malmquist index has been applied to public sector, 
agriculture, banking, electric utilities, transportation, insurance companies, 
agriculture and countries to measure productivity.   
In the literature, Malmquist index has been widely used in measuring the 
productivity of banking sector. In this field, the first attempt came from Berg, 
Forsund et al. (1992). They searched for the impacts of deregulation on the 
productivity of the Norwegian banks throughout 1980's. The results indicate that 
while the banking sector experienced a deterioration during the first years of 
deregulation, an improvement is observed in the following years. 
Fare et al. (1994b) study the productivity growth in 17 OECD countries over the 
period 1979-1988 by using decomposed Malmquist productivity index obtained 
through nonparametric programming methods. They found that over the average 
productivity growth in USA is due to the technical change whereas Productivity 
growth in Japan which is highest in the sample, could largely be attributed to the 
efficiency change.  
Forsund and Kittelsen (1994), applied the Malmquist index and its components to 
measure productivity developments in Norwegian electricity distribution utilities 
over the period of 1983-1989. They found that in the sector on average, there exists 
%2 overall productivity growth which is mainly due to the frontier technology shift. 
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Taskin and Zaim (1997) have also significant studies on the application of Malmquist 
index on comparing the performances of public and private manufacturing industries 
of Turkey over the period of 1974-1991 and on comparison of productivities of high 
and low income countries. They find that overall productivity growth of private 
sector is higher than that of public sector and decomposition of Malmquist index 
shows that although both sectors experience similar technological progresses, public 
sector suffers from efficiency loss hence reducing its overall productivity growth. In 
comparing the high and low income countries to test catching-up hypothesis, they 
employ Malmquist index obtained by nonparametric programming methods. The 
results indicate that the countries with low initial per capita income levels catch up at 
a faster rate whereas countries that have relatively high income depend more on 
technological progress for productivity increases. 
Application of Malmquist index into the health sector has become a popular research 
field currently. One of the initial studies in the literature was Hollingsworth et al. 
(1998).  They use DEA and Malmquist index in performance assessment and they 
find that public sector hospitals perform better than private ones in USA and in EU. 
Roos (1997) investigate the measurement of productivity in hospital services with 
concentrating on eye surgeries by using Malmquist index in Sweden and discuss the 
alternative methods on the measurement of productivity. The paper suggests that the 
use of Malmquist index approach is very appropriate in cases where the service 
provided is complex and where it is hard to collect data on quality of the health care, 
health status, number of patients or visits. Their results indicate that from 1980 to 
1996, overall productivity of eye surgery had increased by %25 per year. 
Giuffrida (1999) proposed a study to investigate the impacts of National Health 
System introduced in UK in 1990. The study covers the period of 1990/91-1994/95. 
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Analysis is based on the Malmquist index obtained using DEA methods and 
decomposition of Malmquist index into its components as pure technical efficiency, 
scale efficiency and technological change. The results show that over the period of 
study, there exists small amount of productivity improvement which largely stems 
from the pure technical and scale efficiency improvements rather than technological 
and there is very limited scope for productivity gains in this sector. 
In education sector, Bradley et al. (2006) used DEA based Malmquist index approach 
to measure the productivity of Further Education providers in England. They have 
500 observations over the period of 1999-2003. Their results show that the mean 
provider efficiency varies between 82% and 86% over the period. Productivity 
change over the period is nearly 17%, and this is comprised of 10% technology 
change and 7% technical efficiency change.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
This chapter describes the methodology used in this paper to measure hospital 
efficiency and productivity. The first sub section is devoted to present the DEA 
technique. The following sub section presents the methodology underlying 
bootstrapping technique. Finally the last sub section explains how Malmquist index 
is derived by using  those methodologies. 
 
4.1. DEA Technique 
This brief section on DEA estimation starts with some basic definitions and notation 
used in the DEA literature. In a simple production technology, there exist two main 
variables, namely inputs and outputs. On this basis, a multi-input and multi-output 
production technology involving N number of inputs and M outputs could be defined 
as follows: 
 
(4.1.1)                             ( , ) :    M NT x y R x can produce y              
where NN Rxxx  ),...,( 1  represents vector of inputs and 
M
M Ryyy  ),...,( 1
represents the vector of outputs. Intuitively, production set T consists of all combinations of 
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inputs and outputs such that x can produce y.  
Production technology could equivalently be represented by output set (also known as 
production possibility set) which is defined as: 
(4.1.2)                            Tyx  Ry xP M   ),(:)(    
Output set is assumed to satisfy: 
 Strong disposability of outputs (and of inputs) 
if )(* xPy   and )(* xPyyy    
 Possibility of inaction (i.e. nothing can be produced from given set of inputs) 
)(0 xP  
 Non zero output levels cannot be produced from zero levels of inputs 
     0)0( P  
 )(xP  is compact (i.e. closed and bounded) That‟s, given finite amount of 
inputs, only finite amount of outputs could be produced. 
  )(xP  is convex 
if   )(, 21 xPyy   then     )()1( 21 xP yy   where  1,0  
           In other words, if two combinations of output levels can be produced with a    
           given input vector x, then any weighted average of these output vectors can   
           also be produced. 
Given the notation presented above, we now move on the definition of output (input) 
distance function which is very useful tool in describing the technology in such a 
way that it enables us to measure efficiency and productivity in a reliable manner. 
Distance function is simply based on radial contractions and expansions. Malmquist 
(1953) and Shephard (1953) introduced this notion, independently in their own 
studies. The advantage of using distance functions is that it allows to define multi 
input and multi output production technology without the need to specify a 
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behavioral objective such as cost minimization or profit maximization (Coelli et al., 
2005: 47).  A researcher could either use input or output distance functions 
depending on the objective of the analysis. Particularly, input distance function 
concentrates on the idea of minimal proportional contraction of the input vector, 
given the output vector whereas output distance function concentrates on the idea of 
maximal proportional expansion of the output vector, given the input vector. Since 
input and output distance functions are analogous, in this chapter only the output 
distance function is defined. Hence, given the input vector, one can define the output 
distance function as follows: 
(4.1.3)        xPy yxDO )()(:min),(       
where 1),(0  yxDO . The basic properties of output distance function that follow 
from the assumptions on output set )(xP discussed above are
*
: 
 0)0,( xDO for all non negative x 
 Non decreasing in y and non increasing in x 
 Linearly homogenous in y 
 Quasi-convex in x and convex in y 
To illustrate the idea of output distance function, see the figure 4.1.1. below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
*
  See Fare and Primont (1995) for proofs and derivations of these properties. 
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Figure 4.1.1. Production Possibility Set and Output Distance Function    
        B  D   
                                       
 C  
 
 
 
To illustrate, in Figure 4.1.1. there are three firms (i.e. observations) each using one 
unit of input to produce two different outputs, 1y  and 2y . Given the production 
possibility set which is the area bounded by production possibility frontier and axes, 
the value of the output distance function for firm A equals to the ratio OBOA . In 
this setting, firm B constitutes the reference technology for firm A. By using one unit 
of input, firm B can produce more than firm A. Thus, given the input, firm A is 
inefficient by an amount of  . In other words, to become efficient firm A should 
proportionally expand its production of both outputs by a fraction of 1  and it can 
still remain within the production possibility frontier. Thus, the value of distance 
function is the reciprocal of the factor by which the production of all output 
quantities could be increased while still remaining in the production possibility set. 
Moreover, since firms B and C are on the boundary of the set, they are the 
benchmark firms and the value of their distance functions equal to 1 which implies 
that those are fully efficient firms. 
Now we are equipped with enough tools to describe and measure the efficiency 
concept. The following discussion begins with Farrell‟s (1957) ideas of input and 
Z y2 
Z
‟ 
A 
P(x) 
y 1  
0 
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output oriented technical efficiency measures
*
. On this basis, Farrell first 
decomposes overall economic efficiency as technical efficiency and allocative 
efficiency and then he further decomposes technical efficiency as scale efficiency 
and pure technical efficiency. To illustrate the idea, again refer to the figure 4.1.1. If 
we have information on prices, then we can draw the iso revenue line ZZ
‟
, and define 
the Farrell‟s measure of allocative efficiency as OBOD i.e. the ratio of maximum 
feasible revenue to the revenue earned at the reference technology. Similarly, Farrell 
defines output oriented technical efficiency as OAOB  i.e. the ratio of maximum 
potential output (at B) to actual or observed output (at A).  Finally, overall measure 
of output efficiency which is sometimes referred as revenue measure of output 
efficiency is defined as OAOD . Now, it is easy to see the relationship between 
allocative, technical and overall efficiency: 
)()( OAOBOBODOAOD   
In other words, 
Overall Efficiency = Allocative Efficiency   Technical Efficiency 
More particularly, output oriented technical efficiency measure basically deals with 
how much outputs could be proportionally expanded without changing the input 
quantities used.  In other words: 
(4.1.4)             xPy yxFO )(:max),(    
which is called as Farrell Output Oriented Measure of Technical Efficiency.  
At this stage, it is important to notice the inverse relationship between output 
distance function ),( yxDO and Farrell output oriented technical efficiency measure
                                                 
*
 Although there exists input and output oriented technical efficiency measures, this section only 
provides the discussion on output oriented measures. Note that they are equivalent measures only if 
CRS technology exists. For further discussion on this, see Fare and Lovell (1978). 
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),( yxFO . Formally, equations (4.1.3) and (4.1.4) together imply that: 
(4.1.5)                                1)),((),( 1   yxD yxF OO  
So, 1),( yxFO   that directly follows from the 1),(0  yxDO . Hence, unlike 
output distance function, the value of Farrell output oriented technical efficiency 
measure which is equal to 1 indicates a fully efficient firm whereas a value above 1 
indicates an inefficient firm by an amount above 1.  
Choice of appropriate measure to calculate the efficiency is not the end of the story. 
Since it is possible to have firms that are efficient both technically and allocatively 
but that are not operating at an optimal scale, one should also be careful in choosing 
the appropriate returns to scale technology that will be applied to the analysis. 
Efficiency could either be estimated assuming CRS, VRS or non increasing returns 
to scale (NIRS) technology. However, the CRS assumption holds when all firms are 
operating at an optimal scale, but this becomes very unrealistic when imperfect 
competition, government regulations, constraints on finance etc. are considered. 
Moreover, when not all firms are operating at an optimal scale, assuming CRS, 
results in technical efficiency measures confounded by scale efficiencies (Coelli et 
al., 2005: 172). Hence, in such cases, it would be more appropriate to assume VRS 
yielding technical efficiency estimates that are free of scale efficiency effects. 
Another advantage of VRS specification is that this approach forms a convex hull of 
intersecting planes that envelope the data points more closely than the CRS and 
NIRS conical hull. To see this, consider the figure 4.1.2. in which one input (x) and 
one output (y) production technology is depicted with respect to the CRS, NIRS and 
VRS assumptions: 
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Figure 4.1.2. CRS, NIRS and VRS Frontiers and Scale Efficiency Mesurement 
 
As it can be inferred from the figure, under CRS technology, proportional changes in 
outputs require proportional changes in inputs, whereas under NIRS technology, to 
scale up outputs, inputs should be scaled up by a larger amount. In figure 4.1.2. CRS 
technology is bounded by the x-axis and the ray trough point a. NIRS that does not 
allow for outward scaling but that allows for convex combinations of existing 
observations and the origin is bounded by the line segments Oa, ab, the horizontal 
extension from b , and the x -axis. Finally, VRS that allows only convex 
combinations of existing observations, is bounded by the x -axis starting from point 
c , and the line segments abca, and the horizontal line emanating from point b . On 
this basis, according to Figure 4.1.2, Farrell output oriented technical efficiency score 
relative to CRS technology equals dedfF CRSO   whereas efficiency score relative to 
VRS technology equals dedgFVRSO  . Thus, scale efficiency is given by 
dgdfSE  . Therefore, it can be concluded that: 
(4.1.6.)           VRSO
CRS
O FFSE   
which measures the deviations from CRS technology in the output direction.  
CRS 
NIRS 
VRS 
x 
y 
0 
a 
b 
c d 
e 
f 
g 
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Thus, an observation is said to be scale efficient if 1SE (i.e. VRSO
CRS
O FF  ). And 
scale inefficient, if 1SE , by an amount above 1.  
So far, required notation and theory underlying the DEA technique is discussed. 
Now, we are ready to formulate the DEA model that is used in this paper. Throughout 
the analysis, VRS technology is assumed because of the reasons explained above. 
Assume that there exist Kk ,...1 observations in the sample. Hence, given our data 
set and assumptions on output set presented so far, for VRS specification, an output 
set that holds for every period and for all observations can be constructed in the 
following way: 
(4.1.7)  m
K
k
kmk
M yyzRy xP 



 


1
:)(        Mm ,...1  
          nkn
K
k
k xxz 
1
         Nn ,...1  
                                            0kz                   Kk ,...1  
           





 z
K
k
k
1
1

  
where zk 's stand for the intensity variables (weights) assigned to each observation 
while constructing the production set. Thus, given the production set and constraints 
specified above, the linear programming problem solved by DEA (i.e. output 
oriented VRS DEA model) for each k, would be as follows: 
 
 
                                                 

 It is the direct consequence of strong disposability of outputs. For a detailed discussion see Fare and  
Grosskopf (1998-2000).  

 Convexity constraint that imposes the VRS assumption . It ensures that an inefficient firm is only 
benchmarked against firms of a similar size. That‟s, the projected point for that firm on the DEA 
frontier is a convex combination of observed firms.  
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where 1 ≤  θ ≤ ∞. Note that, θ* is the feasible proportional increase in outputs that 
could be achieved by the kth observation, if the given inputs were used efficiently. 
So, this linear programming problem should be solved for each observation in the 
sample, separately. Hospitals efficiencies are evaluated in terms of their ),( yxFO  
scores. Hence, smaller the ),( yxFO  , the better the performance of that hospital.   
 
4.2. Bootstrapping 
 
In the literature, it is argued that the efficiency estimates obtained from the DEA 
procedure described in the previous section would be biased upwards. In the context 
of DEA, since the best practice frontier is constructed on the basis of the sample in 
hand, the results would become very sensitive to sample selection. In such cases, bias 
arises when there exist efficient firms (i.e. hospitals) that are not contained in the 
sample. Thus, the observed efficiency scores of inefficient firms calculated on the 
basis of what is observed is an upward biased estimate of their true efficiency (Staat, 
2006: 2259). Since the possibility of having unobserved but efficient firms is very 
high, the original efficiency scores obtained from DEA procedure would be biased. 
Up to now, to overcome this bias, various measures are developed by several authors 
such as Banker (1993), Korostelev et. al. (1995) and Kneip et.al. (1998). 
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More recently, in their 1998 and 2000 papers, for multi-input and multi-output 
model, Simar and Wilson suggested the use of bootstrapping technique which was 
originally developed by Efron (1979) to analyze the sensitivity of the efficiency 
measures to sampling variations
*
 and to correct the bias of DEA estimators. This 
influential work, made bootstrapping highly credited technique that is used to obtain 
bias corrected efficiency scores. 
To begin with, suppose a data generating process (DGP),   generating a random 
sample of: 
(4.2.1.)                                   Kkyx S kk ,...1:),(                                
By some method M, this sample defines estimators of T and )(xP  discussed in the 
previous section, namely Tˆ and )(ˆxP . Given those, for kth observation, the output 
oriented technical efficiency score at point  kk yx , can be calculated as follows:   
(4.2.2)                                     xPy k )(ˆ:maxˆ         
which is the estimator of the true but unobserved population efficiency score k . The 
problem is that sampling distributions of Tˆ and )(ˆxP  could not be inferred because  
  is unknown and the complexity of M makes it almost impossible to determine it. 
However, bootstrapping technique which is based on the idea that there exists a 
consistent estimator of ,   namely ˆ , enables us to obtain consistent estimators of T 
and )(xP , even though   is unknown. 
Now, suppose that, given the sample S, by using our knowledge, we can produce a 
consistent estimator of   namely, ˆ . Then, consider another sample *S  which is 
generated by ˆ  through random resamplings with replacement from S.  
 
                                                 
*
 For more theoretical and detailed discussion of bootstrapping, see Simar and Wilson (1998,2000) 
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Formally, 
(4.2.3)                                       Kkyx S kk ,...1:),( ***   
Similar to S, by some method M, this pseudo sample also defines corresponding 
estimators of T and P(x) that are *Tˆ and *)(ˆxP respectively. Thus, for any pair of 
),( ** kk yx , the corresponding output oriented technical efficiency score is given by: 
(4.2.4)                                      xPy k ** )(ˆ:maxˆ    
Expression (4.2.4) could equivalently be defined as a linear programming problem: 
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In this case, however, since the underlying DGP, ˆ  is already known, the sampling 
distributions of the estimators *Tˆ and *)(ˆxP are completely known, although it may be 
difficult to estimate analytically. Nevertheless, the sampling distributions could 
easily be approximated by Monte Carlo methods. The steps of the approximation can 
be summarized as follows: 
1. Use ˆ  to generate B number of pseudo samples such that 
*
bS , where 
.,...1 Bb   
2. Apply M to each of those samples and obtain the estimators *Tˆ and *)(ˆxP  for 
.,...1 Bb   
3. Obtain *ˆkb for each k, where Kk ,...1 and .,...1 Bb   
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This procedure allows us to estimate the empirical density function of { *ˆkb }𝑏=1
𝐵  
which is nothing more than the Monte Carlo approximation of the distribution of 
*ˆ
kb
conditional onˆ . Intuitively, by repeatedly simulating or mimicking the DGP 
through resampling with replacement and through applying the original estimator to 
each simulated sample, we could approximate the sampling distributions of the 
original estimator.  
Given the assumption
*
 that ˆ  is a consistent estimator of  ,  the bootstrap method 
concludes that the known bootstrap distributions obtained by the procedure described 
above will mimic the original unknown sampling distributions of the estimators of 
interest (Simar and Wilson, 1998: 51)
**
. More formally, 
(4.2.6)                 kk  ˆˆ*  │ˆ   ~   kk  ˆ │   
That‟s to say, within the true world, kˆ is an estimator of k  based on the sample S, 
generated from some DGP,   whereas, in the bootstrap world, *ˆk  is an estimator of 
kˆ based on the sample S
* 
generated fromˆ . Then, if bootstrap is consistent (i.e. if 
ˆ  is a consistent estimator of  ), the known bootstrap distributions will duplicate 
the original and unknown sampling distributions of the estimators (Simar and 
Wilson, 2000: 61). Indeed, the expression in (4.2.6) constitutes the most crucial 
result of bootstrapping technique. By applying this result, not only the bias of kˆ  
(which is the estimator of k ) could be estimated but also, it enables us to estimate 
other statistical properties such as standard errors, variance and confidence intervals 
that eventually allows us to test hypothesis based on those estimates. On this basis, 
we can estimate:   
                                                 
*
  See Hall (1992). 
**
 For more detailed discussion and derivations, see Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000). 
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(4.2.7)                                        kkk Ebias   ˆ,  
by using its bootstrap estimate given by:     
(4.2.8)                                        kkk Ebias  ˆˆ
*
ˆ,ˆ
  
which could be approximated by Monte Carlo realizations  
*ˆ
kb  : 
(4.2.9)                           
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B
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         for Bb ,...1  
Thus, bias corrected estimator of kˆ  is given by: 
(4.2.10)                          
*ˆ2ˆˆ
~
kkkkk asib    
The standard error of kˆ can be estimated by: 
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The confidence interval for k  for some values a  and b given by: 
(4.2.12)                                1ˆ  a    b  Prob kk  
can easily be calculated by using its bootstrap estimate for some bootstrap values *a  
and *b ,which is given by: 
(4.2.13)                  1ˆˆ ****  S   a    b  Prob kkb      for Bb ,...1  
substituting *a  and 
*
b , for a  and b   in (4.2.12) combined with (4.2.13) leads to 
the bootstrap approximation: 
(4.2.14)                            1ˆ ***      S  a    b  Prob kk     
Therefore, 
 (4.2.15)                                   ** ˆˆ   b        a kkk   
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4.3. Malmquist Productivity Index 
This section presents the theory underlying Malmquist index in the light of distance 
functions and bootstrapping discussed in the previous sections. Currently, there exists 
input and output oriented Malmquist indices that were introduced by Cave et al. 
(1982) and that are composed of Shephard (1970) input and output distance functions 
discussed in section 4.1, respectively
*
.  
Following Fare et al. (1994), output oriented Malmquist productivity index based on 
output distance functions is defined by
**
:                                                        
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It may be helpful to illustrate the output oriented Malmquist productivity index on a 
figure. In figure 4.3.1 below, two technologies are involved, one for period t and the 
other for period t+1. Given the figure, productivity change for input-output vectors 
(𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡) and (𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1) based on y-distances (since this is an output oriented 
measure) is given by: 
(4.3.2)        11,,,  ttttO yxyxM  =  
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*
 In this section, to conserve space, only the output oriented Malmquist index is discussed. Input   
  oriented Malmquist index involves a straightforward translation of the notation in the following   
  discussion.  
**
 𝐷0
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡) , for example, measures the distance of firm at time t relative to the frontier at  
  time t+1. Thus, the superscript on the distance function denotes the reference technology whereas   
  superscripts on inputs and outputs denote the time period under consideration. 
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Figure 4.3.1. Output Oriented Malmquist Productivity Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Malmquist index can be decomposed into two different components, namely 
efficiency change (MEFFCH) and technical change (MTECH) defined as: 
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Equation (4.3.1) combined with (4.3.4) and (4.3.5), together imply that: 
 
(4.3.6)                             111   tt
t
t
t
t MTECHMEFFCHM  
The first component measures the change in technical efficiency between time t and 
t+1, and hence whether the production is getting closer to the best practice frontier 
for all observations in the sample (Taskin and Zaim, 1997: 95). The second 
component shows the shift in frontier between time t and t+1. Overall, index values 
t +1 period technology 
 
a 
c = 𝑦𝑡+1 
t period technology 
x 
b 
d 
e 
f = 𝑦𝑡  
𝑥𝑡+1 𝑥𝑡  0 
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greater than one indicates improvement in productivity whereas values less than one 
indicates deterioration in productivity. In figure 4.3.1, efficiency change and 
technical change components can be defined as: 
 
(4.3.7)                                 
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However, Fare et al. (1994) further decomposed (4.3.4) as pure efficiency change 
and scale efficiency change defined by: 
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Hence, (4.3.9) and (4.3.10) combined with (4.3.6) implies that, 
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As noted earlier, the advantage of using Malmquist index is that unlike alternative 
indices, it does not require any information on prices of inputs or outputs. However, 
similar to DEA estimators, Malmquist index is also obtained by non parametric DGP 
based on the estimation of true but unobserved best practice frontier conditional on 
the sample in hand and this makes estimated Malmquist indices very sensitive to 
sample selection bias, too. Hence, to remove this bias, based on their 1998 paper, 
Simar and Wilson (1999) suggested applying bootstrapping technique to Malmquist 
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indices. The procedure is similar to the one explained for DEA estimators
*
. In this 
context, bootstrapping technique provides confidence intervals for Malmquist indices 
that enable us to assess whether productivity changes as measured by the Malmquist 
index are significant in a statistical sense. If it is significant, then the results imply a 
real change in productivity, otherwise it should be considered as nothing more than a 
trick of sampling noise. 
 
 
                                                 
*
  For theory and methodology of estimating and bootstrapping Malmquist indices, see Simar and  
   Wilson (1999). 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
DATA, EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
This chapter first describes the data used in this study. Then, the following sub 
sections present the results obtained from application of the data and comparisons of 
DEA efficiency scores and Malmquist index scores for hospitals in the sample. Final 
sub section is devoted to the evaluation of the reform. 
 
5.1. The Data 
The source of the data used in this paper is the national hospital statistics data of the 
Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Health. The complete MoH data set contains 
observations on approximately 1150 hospitals (public, private, SSK, and university) 
that provide not only outpatient care, but also inpatient care during the period 2001-
2007 (i.e. the period before and after the reform). 
The data available for each hospital includes the type of ownership (MoH including 
the university hospitals, SSK and private), number of beds, hemodialysis equipment, 
amount of blood stock, number of physicians (specialist and practitioner), 
outpatients, number of outpatient visits per physician, inpatients (discharged and 
death), total patient days, number of surgical operations (big, middle, small), number 
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of births, and information on evaluation of services (bed occupation rate, average 
length of stay, speed of discharge from bed, unemployed period for bed and the rate 
of stayed patient).  
Since an adequate efficiency analysis requires a sample of comparable hospitals, first 
of all, the hospitals specialized in just one field of medicine such as mother and child 
health care, physiotherapy and rehabilitation, mental disorders, eye care, oncology, 
cardiology, urgent care and traumatology are eliminated. As a result, we are left with 
744 hospitals in the pre-reform period and 714 hospitals in the post reform period 
(due to the mergers), providing health care services ranging from primary health care 
to specialized inpatient and outpatient care in various fields of medicine.  
Although the data provide detailed information on hospitals, not all hospitals could 
be followed incessantly during the period of 2001-2007. For instance, some began to 
operate in 2002 whereas some in 2004. So, to obtain a balanced panel data, those 
hospitals which are not common over 2001-2007 periods are eliminated. Moreover, 
hospitals that have missing data are excluded from the analysis. 
Finally, we end up with a balanced panel of 441 hospitals (281 MoH, 85 SSK, 45 
university and 30 private hospitals) in the pre-reform period and 415 hospitals (338 
MoH, 47 university and 30 private hospitals) in the post-reform period due to the 
mergers and turnovers. It is important to note that to get valid results, only hospitals 
with a very similar structure and very similar facilities should be compared. The final 
version of our sample that consists of nearly identical hospitals in scale and in size 
guarantees a tractable and homogeneous data set over the period of 2001-2007. 
The DEA model used in this study includes three inputs and six outputs. Inputs are 
defined as number of existing beds representing the capital required to produce 
output, number of specialists (SPECIA) and number of practitioners (PRACT) 
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representing the labor required for production. Outputs are defined as outpatient 
visits (OUTPAT), number of small (SURG-SM), medium (SURG-MD) and big 
(SURG-BIG) surgeries separately, number of births and total inpatient days (TID). 
 
Table 5.1.1. Descriptive Statistics: Mean (Standard Deviation) per year 
YEAR 
OUTPAT SURG-BIG SURG-MD SURG-SM BIRTHS TID BEDS SPECIA PRACT 
2001 214955,22 1447,52 1076,73 587,70 1020,33 50034,88 208,77 49,68 37,51 
  (298720,14) (2414,75) (1340,87) (1219,75) (1332,30) (68392,25) (259,69) (77,19) (90,81) 
2002 220399,14 1592,01 1116,81 684,09 906,12 52287,07 211,82 52,34 39,65 
  (235250,36) (2703,59) (1415,20) (1539,19) (1135,58) (70842,78) (260,34) (80,39) (95,67) 
2003 229076,81 1811,91 1070,55 791,21 892,09 53829,12 215,96 55,05 40,25 
  (240049,62) (2860,64) (1388,82) (2157,04) (1141,68) (72888,00) (257,69) (85,40) (93,51) 
2004 258579,77 2268,04 1227,26 1026,48 877,55 58062,62 223,53 58,56 42,60 
  (255326,19) (3249,63) (1666,85) (3044,90) (1067,25) (76239,64) (272,53) (95,03) (98,60) 
2005 321286,19 2870,06 1427,94 1391,86 893,51 61136,18 239,75 61,49 48,57 
  (315909,07) (3912,31) (2172,73) (3501,86) (1124,98) (81647,78) (277,17) (91,52) (115,26) 
2006 365236,85 3228,41 1684,92 2079,97 875,69 62941,21 252,52 63,72 50,01 
  (353134,60) (4505,66) (2911,19) (6369,73) (1174,21) (82569,36) (283,44) (100,28) (112,83) 
2007 397009,21 3424,44 1966,18 2563,45 1423,76 60884,57 228,70 65,52 52,09 
  (361335,91) (4497,33) (3001,91) (7043,89) (8750,47) (80005,36) (253,03) (110,87) (117,23) 
 
Table 5.1.1. provides sample means and standard deviation of all DEA variables by 
year. Output variables are continuously increasing over the period of 2001-2007, 
except the number of births that declines in 2007 and that may be due to the effects 
of birth controls. On the other hand, we observe sharp rises in the number of 
surgeries and outpatients from 2003 to 2004 and from 2004 to to 2005, as the first 
steps of the reform were introduced. Moreover, from 2003 onwards outpatients 
treated in MoH hospitals has increased whereas those treated in SSK hospitals has 
decreased, reflecting the shift of excess burden on SSK hospitals towards MoH 
hospitals as rationing of patients with respect to membership is alleviated (see 
Appendix A Figure 5.1.1. and Figure 5.1.2.) Input variables also follow an increasing 
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trend over 2001-2007. Moreover, in all years number of specialists is greater than the 
number of practitioners. 
 
5.2. Empirical Results and Discussion 
To obtain empirical results output oriented DEA model under the assumption of VRS 
and output oriented Malmquist Productivity index are used as formulated in 
methodology described in chapter 4. All the computational work is done by software 
package Frontier Efficiency Analysis with R (FEAR) 1.11 developed by Wilson 
(2008)
*
. What distinguishes FEAR from the alternative software packages like DEAP 
or STATA is that it permits to estimate not only non parametric DEA estimates of 
technical, allocative, scale and overall efficiency (while assuming either CRS, NIRS 
or VRS) and Malmquist indices but also it permits to estimate bootstrapped (i.e. bias 
corrected) counterparts of them which enables us to do statistical inference based on 
those findings. In the first sub section of this part, application of the methods and 
estimated efficiency scores of hospitals are discussed whereas in the second sub 
section, application and estimated Malmquist index scores of hospitals are discussed. 
 
5.2.1. Application and Comparison of Output Oriented Farrell Efficiency Scores 
To evaluate the results, first of all, hospitals are grouped according to their ownership 
type, namely MoH (i.e. public hospitals), SSK, university and private hospitals. 
However, to follow the impacts of the reform on hospitals more closely, MoH 
hospitals are further divided into two subgroups: MoH (merged), represents the MoH 
hospitals that will be merged with the SSK hospitals under the supremacy of MoH in 
the year 2005, whereas MoH (independent), represents the MoH hospitals that 
                                                 
*
 For further discussion on FEAR, see FEAR 1.11 Command Reference or User Guide, Wilson (2008) 
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remain the same both administratively and managerially, in the pre and post reform 
periods. Similarly, SSK hospitals are further divided into two subgroups: SSK 
(merged), represents the ones that will be attached to the corresponding MoH 
(merged) hospitals under the rule of MoH, in 2005 and they are completely abolished 
thereafter whereas SSK (revolved) hospitals, represents the ones that will be 
transferred from ownership of SSK to that of MoH administratively but not 
managerially, in 2005 due to the reform. 
On this basis, we first estimate the efficiency scores obtained through the ordinary 
DEA model for each type of hospital and then efficiency scores are re-estimated by 
using bootstrapping method which allows a deeper assessment of efficiency.          
The geometric means of estimated efficiency scores (with and without bootstrapping) 
for each type of hospital are given in Table 5.2.1.1 below: 
Table 5.2.1.1. Comparison of DEA and Bootstrap Efficiency Scores, 2001-2007 
 
In the table, in each year, the first column shows ordinary DEA efficiency scores 
denoted by DEA whereas the second column shows bootstrapped (i.e. bias corrected) 
efficiency scores denoted by DEA
*
. Moreover, it is important to note that since we 
use the output oriented Farrell measure of efficiency which estimates output oriented 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Institution DEA DEA* DEA DEA* DEA DEA* DEA DEA* DEA DEA* DEA DEA* DEA DEA* 
MoH 
(merged) 
1.619 1.771 1.631 1.782 1.716 1.863 1.442 1.574 1.451 1.610 1.270 1.370 1.244 1.445 
MoH 
(indep.) 
1.410 1.564 1.428 1.595 1.482 1.649 1.343 1.486 1.401 1.576 1.282 1.401 1.352 1.475 
SSK 
(revolved) 
1.102 1.251 1.099 1.260 1.121 1.297 1.215 1.364 1.357 1.533 1.163 1.267 1.137 1.243 
SSK 
(merged) 
1.250 1.397 1.280 1.437 1.316 1.475 1.430 1.581 - - - - - - 
Univ. 1.213 1.335 1.319 1.483 1.192 1.326 1.170 1.301 1.260 1.430 1.184 1.299 1.107 1.210 
Private 1.338 1.564 1.371 1.624 1.393 1.648 1.369 1.583 1.260 1.486 1.266 1.448 1,219 1.394 
OVERALL  1.338 1.492 1.363 1.534 1.390 1.560 1.317 1.464 1.370 1.548 1.251 1.370 1,277 1,398 
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radial expansion factors to calculate efficiency scores, the smaller the efficiency 
score the better the performance of that hospital. The results show that hospitals 
which are indicated as inefficient by the ordinary DEA procedure are actually more 
inefficient than it is thought to be due to the bias inherent in ordinary DEA scores. 
However, there exist significant improvements in the overall efficiencies of hospitals 
in 2006 and in 2007 compared to 2001. 
An advantage of bootstrapping is that, as mentioned earlier, it predicts the efficiency 
scores within a given confidence interval which enables us to do statistical 
inferences. On this basis, Figure 5.2.1.1
*
 which shows confidence interval widths for 
bias corrected efficiency scores of 2001 suggests that SSK hospitals are significantly 
more efficient than MoH hospitals in the year 2001. (a finding which is also 
supported by Table 5.2.1.1) 
 
Figure 5.2.1.1. Confidence Intervals for Bias Corrected Efficiency Scores of 2001 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
*
  In the following figures, ub stands for upper bound of the confidence interval whereas lb stands for  
    lower bound and deabc denotes the bias corrected DEA efficiency score.  
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Furthermore, it also suggests that the efficiency differentials among institutions of 
different type are statistically significant. It is very reasonable to obtain those results 
because approximately %60 of population (an amount corresponding to 32 million 
people) was covered by SSK and SSK hospitals were obliged to deliver heath care 
services to all those 32 million people (later increased to 45 million) and this fact 
eventually led SSK hospitals to deliver more outputs (number of outpatients, 
inpatient days, births and surgeries) relative to MoH hospitals, given the same 
amount of nearly identical inputs with that of MoH, hence making SSK hospitals 
relatively more efficient. Indeed, this result shows the extent of overcrowding in SSK 
hospitals that operated over capacity permanently. Hence, the reform should be such 
that it should distribute the excess burden on SSK hospitals towards other institutions 
The trends for the year 2002 suggests that the significant efficiency differentials 
among institutions increased and bias corrected efficiency scores of all type of 
institutions deteriorated, except with an improvement in efficiency score of 
university hospitals (see Appendix B Figure 5.2.1.2.).  
In the year 2003 (i.e. the year just before the reform), as Figure 5.2.1.3 suggests, 
regardless of ownership type, all hospitals' efficiency scores were worsened and 
efficiency differentials among different type hospitals deepened and remained 
significant as in the previous years. Those deepening problems of the Turkish health 
sector clearly shows the necessity of the reform to establish a general health 
insurance uniting all the institutions under a single umbrella and to establish a 
standard association which provides egalitarian, accessible, productive, efficient and 
high quality health care to its members. 
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Figure 5.2.1.3. Confidence Intervals for Bias Corrected Efficiency Scores of 2003 
 
 
Hence, in the light of those problems, in April 2003, a protocol signed between MoH 
and the Ministry of Finance. With this protocol, civil servants earned right to benefit 
from private health institutions and their expenditures in private hospitals were 
financed by their own institution, namely ES. In July 2003, MoH, Ministry of Labor 
and Social Security and the Ministry of Finance signed a collective utilization 
protocol that enabled the members of BK, ES, active public employees and green 
card holders to benefit from SSK hospitals, and that enabled members of SSK to 
benefit from MoH hospitals. As a result of those attempts that aimed to distribute 
excess burden on SSK hospitals and to stimulate the demand towards other hospitals 
operating undercapacity, we observe more promising results in 2004. According to 
the Figure 5.2.1.4 below, with the introduction of first steps of the reform, a 
convergence trend in efficiencies of different type of institutions is observed. In other 
words, significant efficiency differentials among hospitals began to be eliminated, 
leading towards more uniform health delivery.  
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Figure 5.2.1.4. . Confidence Intervals for Bias Corrected Efficiency Scores of 2004 
 
 
Particularly, in the year 2004, we observe an improvement in the efficiency scores of 
MoH (both merged and independent.), university and private hospitals whereas a 
deterioration in SSK (both revolved and merged) hospitals, as rationing of patients 
with respect to the membership is alleviated. That is, on one hand, SSK members 
began to shift towards MoH, university and private hospitals and on the other hand, 
due to the invasion of MoH hospitals by SSK members, civil servants have started to 
use private hospitals. This led to a more equal distribution of burden among hospitals 
and hence increasing efficiency of MoH, university and private hospitals. 
In 2005, universal health coverage was introduced in Turkey. With this final step, 
ownerships of all SSK hospitals were transferred to the MoH and all security 
institutions are gathered under one roof, namely Social Security Institution (SGK). 
From 2005 onwards, all patients are covered by SGK and all patients could benefit 
from either MoH, university or private hospitals.
*
 Surprisingly, the results of 2005 
suggest that efficiency scores of all type of institutions, with the exception of private 
                                                 
*
 Note that we can follow SSK (merged) hospitals until the year 2004 because unlike SSK (revolved)  
  hospitals that were transferred to the ownership of MoH, those ones were abolished thereafter. 
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ones, declined compared to 2004 scores (see appendix B, Figure 5.2.1.5). The most 
remarkable deterioration is observed in revolved SSK hospitals (i.e. mean DEA score 
increased from 1.364 to 1.533), a finding which is consistent with a declining 
number of outpatients in revolved SSK hospitals by 2 million from 2004 to 2005. A 
good explanation of this sharp decline could be that beginning from 2004, the shift of 
SSK members towards MoH hospitals to benefit from less crowded hospitals and to 
get more qualified health care was accelerated. Hence, this further reduced the 
efficiency of revolved SSK hospitals by reducing their output level, given the inputs. 
Moreover, in 2005 a shock was given to the existing health care system and the 
system experienced an adaptation process. The change which was implemented both 
administratively and managerially lengthened the adaptation period to the new 
system and this reduced the overall efficiency in 2005. By contrast, an improvement 
in efficiency of private hospitals in this period could be attributed to the encouraging 
efforts of the government to attract private investments to health sector. 
However, in 2006, when the unification process has taken its roots, as Figure 5.2.1.6 
suggests, the convergence process that began in 2004 became noticeable.  
 
Figure 5.2.1.6 Confidence Intervals for Bias Corrected Efficiency Scores of 2006 
 
1,000
1,100
1,200
1,300
1,400
1,500
1,600
1,700
1,800
1,900
2,000
MoH (indep.) MoH 
(merged)
SSK 
(revolved)
Univ. Private
institution
ub
lb
deabc
51 
 
Moreover, Figure 5.2.1.6 indicates that there exists an improvement in efficiency 
scores of all type of institutions, with previously SSK owned revolved hospitals 
being the most efficient whereas the private hospitals being the least efficient ones. 
Also, as Table 5.2.1.1 shows, overall efficiency of Turkish health care sector has 
increased when compared to the pre-reform period (i.e. the period of 2001-2003), a 
finding which is also supported by Figure 5.2.1.6. Therefore, one may conclude that 
positive expected effects of the reform began to be realized. 
In 2007, we observe further improvements in efficiency scores of SSK, university 
and private hospitals whereas worsening in MoH hospitals. According to Figure 
5.2.1.7, to some extent convergence obtained in 2006 has broken down.  
Figure 5.2.1.7. Confidence Intervals for Bias Corrected Efficiency Scores of 2007 
 
By contrast to the bootstrap efficiency scores above, efficiency components of the 
Malmquist index scores of MoH (merged) and private hospitals indicate an 
improvement in efficiency of MoH (merged) but deterioration in efficiency of private 
hospitals in 2007. However, as Table 5.2.2.1 below suggests, this inconsistency 
actually arises from unexpected scale efficiency changes in the post reform period. 
Although pure efficiency components of Malmquist index for those hospitals are in 
line with efficiency changes indicated by bootstrap DEA, efficiency components are 
 not because changes in scale efficiency offset changes in pure efficiency in overall. 
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5.2.2. Application and Comparison of Malmquist Productivity Index Scores 
The output oriented and bootstrapped Malmquist productivity index with its three 
components, namely technical change, pure efficiency change and scale efficiency 
change is estimated for all type of hospitals in the sample over the period of 2001-
2007. The results are shown in Table 5.2.2.1 below: 
 
Table 5.2.2.1. Cumulative Malmquist Index and Its Components, 2001-2007 
OVERALL MALMQUIST EFFCH TECHCH PUREFFCH SCALEFFCH 
2001 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
2002 1,028 0,987 1,042 0,981 1,005 
2003 1,017 0,967 1,052 0,963 1,005 
2004 1,097 1,022 1,074 1,016 1,006 
2005 1,119 0,951 1,176 0,973 0,978 
2006 1,116 1,078 1,035 1,063 1,014 
2007 1,216 1,083 1,122 1,043 1,039 
MoH (Indep.)           
2001 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
2002 1,019 0,997 1,022 0,988 1,010 
2003 0,979 0,953 1,027 0,951 1,002 
2004 1,129 1,046 1,079 1,050 0,996 
2005 1,169 0,977 1,198 1,009 0,968 
2006 1,131 1,101 1,028 1,103 0,998 
2007 1,247 1,056 1,182 1,048 1,008 
MoH (merged with SSK)           
2001 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
2002 1,018 0,985 1,033 0,993 0,993 
2003 1,002 0,965 1,039 0,944 1,022 
2004 1,173 1,120 1,048 1,123 0,997 
2005 1,154 1,022 1,129 1,116 0,915 
2006 1,199 1,230 0,975 1,275 0,964 
2007 1,345 1,243 1,082 1,215 1,023 
SSK (revolved)           
2001 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
2002 1,062 0,988 1,075 1,002 0,986 
2003 1,092 0,949 1,151 0,983 0,965 
2004 0,980 0,895 1,095 0,907 0,987 
2005 0,935 0,789 1,185 0,815 0,968 
2006 1,001 0,942 1,062 0,937 1,006 
2007 1,081 1,014 1,065 0,958 1,059 
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Table 5.2.2.1 (cont‟d)  
SSK (merged with MoH) MALMQUIST EFFCH TECHCH PUREFFCH SCALEFCH 
2001 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
2002 1,034 0,968 1,068 0,976 0,991 
2003 1,064 0,929 1,146 0,950 0,978 
2004 0,951 0,875 1,087 0,874 1,001 
University           
2001 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
2002 1,031 0,952 1,084 0,920 1,035 
2003 1,074 1,120 0,959 1,018 1,100 
2004 1,134 1,132 1,002 1,036 1,092 
2005 1,166 1,021 1,141 0,958 1,066 
2006 1,203 1,150 1,046 1,018 1,129 
2007 1,275 1,349 0,945 1,087 1,240 
Private 
    
  
2001 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
2002 1,036 0,965 1,074 0,976 0,989 
2003 1,098 0,944 1,163 0,961 0,983 
2004 1,095 0,991 1,105 0,977 1,014 
2005 1,122 1,071 1,047 1,062 1,008 
2006 1,173 1,112 1,054 1,057 1,051 
2007 1,198 1,098 1,091 1,106 0,991 
 
This table allows us to follow the changes in productivity trends of hospitals over the 
period of 2001-2007. The values in the table are the geometric means of 
bootstrapped Malmquist scores of each type of hospital and they are obtained 
cumulatively over 2001-2007. Hence, as noted earlier, a value greater than unity 
indicates improvement in that component whereas a value less than unity indicates 
deterioration.   
On this basis, as Table 5.2.2.1 suggests, from 2001 to 2007, we observe significant 
improvements in Malmquist scores of MoH (indep) hospitals. Up to 2006, this 
increase in their productivity could largely be attributed to the efficiency change, 
implying that production gets closer to the best practice frontier, rather than technical 
change, more particularly, this progress in efficiency stems from the pure efficiency 
change rather than scale efficiency change. However, in 2007, the trend for MoH 
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(indep) is reversed. In 2007, the enhancement in productivity of MoH (indep) is 
largely due to the improvements in their technical change, even though all 
components are above the unity. By contrast to the previous years, in 2007, MoH 
(indep) hospitals began to experience developments also in their scale efficiency 
scores implying that they get closer to the optimal scale of production. Moreover, it 
is important to note that the year 2004 in which the first steps of the reform was 
introduced represents a kind of turning point for MoH (indep) hospitals because 
thereafter they began to undertake significant progresses in their Malmquist score 
and in its components. 
The similar trends also apply for the MoH (merged) hospitals.  The improvements in 
their productivity scores arise largely from efficiency and pure efficiency changes, 
with jumps in their technical and scale efficiency scores in 2007. 
For SSK (revolved) hospitals whose ownership are transferred to MoH in 2005, we 
observe a productivity loss over the period of 2001-2007 (i.e. a decline from 1,062 to 
1,001). Except for 2004 and 2005, the improvements in their technical change, and 
later in scale efficiency change are able to offset the worsening in the efficiency and 
pure efficiency change, leading to Malmquist scores above unity and hence an 
improvement in overall productivity. Note that in 2004, the year just before the 
transfer of SSK (revolved) hospitals to the MoH, we observe a Malmquist score 
below unity, implying the necessity of the reform. Also, in the first year of the 
reform, in 2005, we observe deterioration in productivity which is largely due to the 
uncertainties of the transition period. However, in 2006 and 2007 positive effects of 
the reform began to be realized, yielding to significant improvements in productivity 
and its components. Currently, productivity improvements in SSK (revolved) 
hospitals still rely mostly on technical change rather than efficiency change, 
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implying that they encounter outward shifts in their production frontier.   
As noted earlier, SSK (merged) hospitals could be followed up to 2004 because 
unlike SSK (revolved) hospitals, those ones are merged with the MoH (merged) and 
completely abolished thereafter. Based on the Table 5.2.2.1, the Malmquist scores for 
SSK (merged) hospitals indicate that similar to SSK (revolved) hospitals, those ones 
also relied on technical change rather than efficiency change to meet the increased 
demand for the health services. However, improvements in their technical change 
component could not offset the deterioration in efficiency change component in 
2004, leading to reduction in productivity. Therefore, the results indicate that the 
mergers between SSK and the corresponding MoH hospitals actually contributed to 
the productivity of MoH (merged) hospitals and at the the same time it enabled the 
elimination of those unproductive SSK (merged) hospitals. 
For university and private hospitals, we expect a productivity improvement that 
mainly stems from scale efficiency improvements as members of SSK began to 
benefit from university and private hospitals from 2004 onwards. The results found 
are in line with our expectations. According to Table 5.2.2.1, for both university and 
private hospitals, there exist improvements in overall productivity scores and its 
components with significant improvements in scale efficiency from 2004 onwards. 
In overall, according to Table 5.2.2.1, from 2001 to 2007, Turkish health sector has 
experienced a noteworthy productivity improvement that is concentrated on the last 
two years of the reform and that is largely due to the technical changes.  
The Figure 5.2.2.1 below summarizes the results of Table 5.2.2.1.  The figure shows 
cumulative Malmquist index scores in Table 5.2.2.1 over the period of 2001-2007. In 
the figure, the period of 2001-2004 represents the pre-reform period and the period 
of 2005-2007 represents the transition and the post reform periods.  
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Figure 5.2.2.1. Cumulative Malmquist Index Scores, 2001-2007 
 
 
On this basis, as figure 5.2.2.1 also suggests, the year 2004 characterizes a turning 
point in productivities. From 2004 onwards, MoH (indep), MoH (merged), university 
and private hospitals experience productivity improvements above the overall 
average whereas SSK (revolved) hospitals fall behind it. Moreover, poor 
performance of SSK (merged) hospitals over 2001-2004 period actually supports the 
idea of the reform (note that SSK (merged) hospitals could be followed only up to 
the year 2004). Hence, all those results obtained are in line with our prior 
expectations and are in favor of the reform. 
Another important issue that needs to be addressed in this section is that whether the 
productivity changes as measured by the Malmquist index are significant in a 
statistical sense. If it is significant, then the results imply a real change in 
productivity, otherwise it should be considered as nothing more than a trick of 
sampling noise. To distinguish between the two, the results obtained by 
bootstrapping which provides the estimates of bias corrected Malmquist index scores 
within a given confidence interval could be used.  
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On this basis, Figure 5.2.2.2
*
 shows the confidence intervals for bootstrapped 
Malmquist indices of 2001-2002 for each institution. 
 
Figure 5.2.2.2. Confidence Interval for Bootstrapped Malmquist Index of 2001-2002 
 
  
In the figure, when value one is assumed as critical point, it can easily be seen that 
the estimated Malmquist indices are significantly above one. Hence, one can 
conclude that all type of institutions experienced significant productivity 
improvements in a statistical sense from 2001 to 2002, with SSK hospitals, 
especially the revolved ones being more productive than MoH (both indep and 
merged) hospitals. Hence, there exist productivity differentials among SSK hospitals 
and the rest of the hospitals. Moreover, narrow confidence interval widths suggest 
the accuracy of our estimation. 
The following figure shows the confidence interval for each institution and 
corresponding bootstrapped Malmquist index scores, from 2003 to 2004, i.e. the year 
just before the reform (for Malmquist scores and confidence intervals of 2002-2003 
period, see Appendix B, Figure 5.2.2.3). 
                                                 
*
 In the following figures, malm ub stands for upper bound of the confidence interval for Malmquist  
   index whereas malm  lb stands for lower bound and malmbc denotes the bias corrected Malmquist  
   index score. 
0,000
0,200
0,400
0,600
0,800
1,000
1,200
1,400
MoH 
(indep.)
MoH 
(merged)
SSK 
(revolved)
SSK 
(merged)
Univ. Private
institution
malm ub
malm lb
malmbc
58 
 
Figure 5.2.2.4. Confidence Interval for Bootstrapped Malmquist Index of 2003-2004 
 
 
When compared to Malmquist scores of 2001-2002, in this case we have higher 
productivity scores for MoH (both indep and merged) hospitals and lower 
productivity scores for SSK (both merged and revolved) hospitals, a finding which is 
also supported by Figures 5.2.1.4 and 5.2.2.1, as members of SSK began to benefit 
from MoH hospitals due to the collective utilization protocol signed between MoH, 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security and the Ministry of Finance in July 2003. With 
this protocol, as our results also suggests, outputs of MoH hospitals have increased 
whereas outputs of SSK hospitals have decreased, given the inputs, leading MoH 
hospitals to be more productive by enabling those hospitals to employ their 
previously unused capacity. Moreover, we observe a small amount of improvement 
in productivity scores of university hospitals which may be a result of increased 
demand of MoH members for affordable and higher quality health care which could 
not be satisfactorily provided by MoH hospitals since the invasion of SSK members 
to MoH hospitals due to the new law. By contrast, we observe deterioration in 
productivity scores of private hospitals from 2003 to 2004. Moreover, we observe 
significant productivity differentials not only in efficiency scores but also in 
productivity scores of institutions in this period (see Figure 5.2.1.4.), implying a need 
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for standardized health delivery system that will be introduced in 2005. 
The Figure 5.2.2.7 shows the confidence intervals and corresponding bootstrapped 
Malmquist index scores, in 2006-2007 for each institution. (for Malmquist scores and 
confidence intervals of the periods 2004-2005 and 2005-2006, see Appendix B, 
Figure 5.2.2.5 and Figure 5.2.2.6).  
 
Figure 5.2.2.7. Confidence Interval for Bootstrapped Malmquist Index of 2006-2007 
 
 
In the figure, we have productivity scores which are significantly above the unity. 
When compared to the Malmquist index scores of 2001-2002, in this period, all 
institutions experienced significant productivity improvements, except with a small 
productivity loss in private hospitals which may be due to the government‟s attitude 
to coordinate monetary and fiscal policies together with movements in private 
investment. When compared to the Malmquist index scores of 2003-2004, we 
observe significant improvements in productivity scores of SSK (revolved), 
university and private hospitals but a small decline in productivities of MoH 
hospitals, due to the unification of health services.  
Besides those, in this period, similar to the trend in efficiency scores, we can observe 
a convergence also in productivity scores of institutions (see Figure 5.2.1.6.). In other 
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words, significant productivity differentials among institutions has eliminated as a 
result of unification and standardization of health services with health sector reform 
introduced in 2004.  
 
5.2.3. Evaluation of the Reform 
To evaluate the impacts of the reform on society and consistency of our empirical 
results, it would be beneficial to discuss some concepts such as patient satisfaction, 
quality of health care services provided and per capita public health expenditures. On 
this basis, Figure 5.2.3.1 below shows the results of a survey conducted by Turkish 
Statistical Institute on satisfaction derived from health care services received over the 
period of 2003-2007. 
 
Figure 5.2.3.1: Satisfaction from Health Care Services, 2003-2007 
 
 
According to the figure, it seems that, although there are uncertain patients, 
satisfaction has increased continuously from 2003 (when the first step of the reform 
was introduced) to 2007, except with a small decline from 2005 to 2006 which 
corresponds to the transition period. So, one may conclude that the reform managed 
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to increase the percentage of satisfied patients from %40 to %66 within five years.  
Moreover, within the context of the survey, people are asked whether there exist a 
problem about quality of health services provided. The results are shown in the 
following figure: 
 
Figure 5.2.3.2. “Is there a problem about quality of health services?”, 2003-2007 
  
 
 
The results clearly show that from 2003 to 2007, percentage of people who found 
health care service received is of good quality has increased from % 48 to %75. 
Therefore, from those figures, one can infer that health care reform has actually 
succeeded in Turkey and positive effects of the reform began to be realized 2005 
onwards, particularly. 
For the corresponding post-reform period our empirical results suggest that Turkish 
health sector experienced continuous and significant efficiency and productivity 
improvements that largely stems from efficiency and scale improvements for MoH, 
university and private hospitals and from technical improvements for SSK hospitals. 
Intuitively, this result implies that insufficiencies in health care, inflexibilities in 
hospital management and inefficiencies in the referral system that caused 
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accumulations in hospitals and increased the costs while decreasing the quality of 
health service were removed as rationing of patients with respect to membership is 
alleviated with the implementation of the reform. Hence, as a result of the 
distribution of excess burden among hospitals, patients are now provided 
standardized health care services by enough number of health personnel in less 
crowded, efficiently managed hospitals, regardless of their employment status or 
type of health coverage and this fact is eventually reflected in patient satisfaction 
surveys.Therefore, one can conclude that results obtained by Turkish Statistical 
Institute‟s survey are in line with our findings. 
The following figure shows the real per capita public health expenditures throughout 
the post reform period. 
 
Figure 5.2.3.3 Real Public Health Care Expenditures (Per Capita), 2004-2008 
 
 
The figure suggests that real per capita public health expenditures of different 
institutions follow the same trend as in efficiency and productivity scores and so they 
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in 2008 with the implementation of Universal Health Insurance system which covers 
the whole population regardless of the employment status. Meanwhile, for the same 
period, our empirical results (which indicates significant efficiency improvements in 
efficiency scores of all institutions) imply that from the year 2003 onwards, with the 
same amount of inputs, institutions have began to produce more outputs and this 
eventually led to a reduction in per capita health care expenditures as confirmed by 
the figure above.  
To sum up, it seems that the reform process that has been initiated in 2003, has 
restructured the health care delivery of Turkey, to some extent it has established 
financially sustainable health care system that covers the whole population and it has 
improved the quality in health care services delivered by giving patients a possibility 
to choose the institution they want to be treated and so by encouraging competition 
among different health care providers. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This study investigates the impacts of health sector reform on the efficiencies and 
productivities of public and private hospitals in Turkey both in the pre and post 
reform periods, namely the period of 2001-2007, by using DEA, bootstrap DEA, and 
bootstrap Malmquist productivity index. The sample studied includes 441 hospitals 
(281 MoH, 85 SSK, 45 university and 30 private) in the pre-reform period and 415 
hospitals (338 MoH, 47 university and 30 private) in the post-reform period due to 
the mergers and transformations.  
Bootstrap DEA results indicate that throughout 2001-2003, efficiency scores of all 
institutions deteriorated and efficiency differentials among institutions widened such 
that SSK (revolved) hospitals being the most efficient and MoH (merged) hospitals 
being the least efficient. In 2003, due to the implementation of first steps of the 
reform, we observed improvements in efficiency scores of MoH, university and 
private hospitals but deterioration in efficiency scores of SSK hospitals, as rationing 
of patients with respect to membership is alleviated. In 2006, the year following the 
unification of all social security institutions under one roof, efficiency scores of all 
institutions has improved. In 2007, further improvements in efficiency scores of SSK 
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(revolved), university and private hospitals are accompanied with small reductions in 
efficiency scores of MoH hospitals and efficiency scores of all institutions converge 
towards each other. 
Comparison of bootstrap Malmquist productivity indices indicates that throughout 
the pre-reform period there were significant productivity differentials among 
institutions in such a way that SSK hospitals were the most productive whereas MoH  
hospitals were the least productive ones. Moreover, it seems that in this period 
almost all institutions suffered from efficiency losses as it is also suggested by 
bootstrap DEA scores. However, in the post-reform period, all institutions have 
experienced statistically significant productivity improvements. More particularly, 
improvements in productivity of SSK hospitals largely relied on technical change 
whereas those of MoH mostly relied on efficiency change. On the other hand, 
improvements in productivity scores of university and SSK hospitals could largely be 
attributed to scale efficiency improvements as SSK members and public employees 
began to benefit actively from those hospitals. Furthermore, productivity scores of 
institutions began to converge due to the standardization brought by the reform.  
Therefore, it seems that all the expected positive effects of the reform have been 
realized. Slightly reduced efficiency in previously SSK owned hospitals have been 
more than offset by increased efficiency in MoH hospitals as well as in private and 
university hospitals, leading to more accessible, egalitarian and higher quality service 
provision which also reflects itself in patients‟ satisfaction surveys and which is due 
to the less waiting time by switching from queuing regime to an appointment regime. 
Also, significant scale adjustments in small scale private and university hospitals and 
significant productivity improvements which are highly instrumental in meeting the 
health needs of increased patients with health insurance coverage seem to have taken 
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place. Finally, with the standardization of health care provision system among 
institutions, not only efficiency and productivity scores, but also health care 
expenditures of institutions converged towards each other, yielding to a uniform 
health care delivery system. And although it is too early to conclude, one can claim 
that the reform is able to discipline public health care expenditures and it established 
financially sustainable health insurance system based on capitation, not on 
employment status. 
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Figure 5.1.1. Changes in the Number of Outpatients Treated Per Year in MoH 
Hospitals, 2001-2006 
 
 
Figure 5.1.2. Changes in the Number of Outpatients Treated Per Year in SSK 
(revolved) and SSK (merged) Hospitals, 2001-2006 
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Figure 5.2.1.2. Confidence Intervals for Bias Corrected Efficiency Scores of 2002 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2.1.5. Confidence Intervals for Bias Corrected Efficiency Scores of 2005 
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Figure 5.2.2.3. Confidence Interval for Bootstrapped Malmquist Index of 2002-2003 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2.2.5. Confidence Interval for Bootstrapped Malmquist Index of 2004-2005 
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Figure 5.2.2.6. Confidence Interval for Bootstrapped Malmquist Index of 2005-2006 
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